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Abstract—Different from the traditional software vulnerability,
the microarchitecture side channel has three characteristics:
extensive influence, potent threat, and tough defense. The main
reason for the micro-architecture side channel is resource sharing.
There are many reasons for resource sharing, one of which is
SMT (Simultaneous Multi-Threading) technology. In this paper,
we define the SMT Transient Channel, which uses the transient
state of shared resources between threads to steal information.
To mitigate it, we designed a security demand-based dynamic
mitigation (DDM) to Mitigate the SMT transient channels. The
DDM writes the processes security requirements to the CPU
register sets, and the operating system calls the HLT instruction
to dynamically turn on and off the hyper-threading according to
the register values to avoid the side channels caused by execution
resource sharing. During the implementation of the scheme, we
modified the Linux kernel and used the MSR register groups
of Intel processor. The evaluation results show that DDM can
effectively protect against the transient side-channel attacks such
as PortsMash that rely on SMT, and the performance loss of
DDM is less than 8%.
Index Terms—microarchitecture, SMT, side channel mitigation
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, computer security researchers have dis-
covered many side channel attacks based on computer mi-
croarchitecture. These attack programs exploit the flaws of
CPU microarchitecture design to steal secret information. The
microarchitecture side channel is different from the traditional
attack because those security risks come from underlying
hardware. Besides, computers threatened by the vulnerabilities
are widely distributed, nearly a decade of Intel, AMD and
ARM CPU products, including most personal computers and
cloud servers, are all under threat. How to solve micro-
architecture side channels is a critical issue to protect computer
system security.
The root cause of microarchitecture side channels is re-
source sharing. Many reasons lead to resource sharing, and
SMT (Simultaneous Multi-Threading) is one of them. SMT,
also called hyper-threading, is a computer parallel technique,
which permits several independent threads to issue to multiple
functional units each cycle. The objective of SMT is to
substantially increase processor utilization in the face of both
long memory latencies and limited available parallelism per
thread [2]. In order to keep the implementation overhead
of SMT below 5% to the relative chip size and meet the
maximum power requirements. Only the architecture state and
some registers are duplicated, but that logical processors share
nearly all other resources on the physical processor core, such
as caches, execution units, branch predictors, control logic, and
buses [21]. The shared resources mentioned above between
threads (logical cores) in the same physical bring many side
channels.
SMT transient channel is a kind of microarchitectural side
channel that exploits the transient state of shared resources
between threads in a shared physical core to steal key informa-
tion. Transient state means the microarchitecture state utilized
by side channels are not preserved during context switches. We
will describe the specific details related to the above definition
in Section II. PortsMash, CacheBleed, and MemJam are all
examples of SMT transient channels.
In order to protect against the SMT transient channel,
computer security researchers and engineers have come up
with many defensive measures. Yarom Y [9] recommended
to increase the cache bank bandwidth or modify the way of
memory accesses to protect victim processes from CacheBleed
threat. Percival [23] suggested partitioning the L1 cache be-
tween threads to eliminate the cache contention. However,
new caches or new memory access only improve the security
of future computers, not existing processors. In addition,
these measures only address some transient channels that
are caused by cache sharing within a core. In addition to
cache sharing, SMT also presents security risks caused by
execution port sharing [6] and ALU sharing [21]. Constant
times [8,13,20] could theoretically solve all micro-architecture
time side channels. Moghimi [22] proposed that only code
with true constant-time properties, i.e., constant execution flow
and constant memory accesses can be expected to have no
remaining leakage on modern microarchitectures. However,
constant time brings a significant performance overhead re-
duced its feasibility, sometimes source codes of application
software also need to be modified. Disable SMT is one of the
most common defense methods in the industry today, and it
requires no changes to the processor hardware and software
code. However, turning off hyperthreading can also cause
significant throughput and performance losses. In order to
keep SMT on, STEALTHMEM [24] did not assign the logical
cores of the same physical core to different VM to avoid
SMT channels. Although STEALTHMEM guarantees SMT
on, it does not make full use of hyper-threading technology
to improve server throughput, and it is only applicable to the
server-side. The above defense methods are static. The static
characteristic includes two aspects. Firstly, defense time is
static so that the computer system has been under the influence
of defense all the time. Secondly, defense space is static. All
processor cores in computer system will be affected.
The drawback of static defense is that it compromises the
performance of the whole system in order to guarantee the
security of a small number of processes. In order to reduce
performance losses, Z Wang proposed a selective partitioning
solution [25]. Selective partitioning suggested that the change
of process scheduling or resources reallocation only works
for critical processes, but they did not give the specific
implementation scheme. Similar to selective partitioning, a
system-level detection mechanism is proposed in [26], which
monitors processes behaviors and matches its features with
malicious programs. The operating system makes adjustments
if the process behaves suspiciously. Requiring prior knowledge
of malicious processes is a disadvantage of mechanism in [26].
To sum up, two problems exist in the current defenses:
incomplete coverage of types and significant performance
loss of static defense. Therefore, the purpose of this study
is to improve the previous work and find a mechanism to
mitigate the SMT transient channel. The defense time and
space should be dynamic and based on users demand to
decrease performance loss. In this work, we propose a low
performance loss mechanism called DDM.
We evaluate the implementation and show that DDM ef-
fectively mitigates PortsMash, and we theoretically show that
it can also defend other SMT transient channels. The perfor-
mance evaluation shows that DDM introduces less than 8%
negligible performance overhead.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• This survey summarizes and proposes the concept of
SMT transient channel (section II).
• We use HLT instructions in a new way to adjust the pro-
cessor (supporting hyperthreading) resources allocation.
• We propose a new defense mechanism called DDM
(section III) to defend against SMT transient channels and
minimize performance losses. This mechanism schedules
logical cores or threads dynamically based on the de-
mands of the users applications.
We implement our new mechanism in section IV and make
a security and performance evaluation of the new mitigation
in section V. Discussion is covered in Section VI, and Section
VII concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Microarchitecture
In order to improve the utilization of processor hardware
resources, chip designers have been working on mining the
potential parallelism of instruction execution. Superscalars
do so by issuing and executing multiple instructions from a
single thread, exploiting instruction-level parallelism [12]. In
order to heighten instruction-level parallelism, multi-threaded
superscalars hide latencies of one thread by switching to and
executing instructions from another thread, thereby exploiting
thread-level parallelism [3]. However, CPU will be limited
by the instruction-level parallelism in a single thread. In
SMT processors, thread-level parallelism can come from either
multi-threaded, parallel programs or individual, independent
programs in a multiprogramming workload [3]. SMT makes a
single physical processor appear as multiple logical processors.
Each logical processor has one copy of the architecture state,
and the logical processors share a single set of physical
execution resources [4].
Table 1 shows the internal resources of the SMT processor
and their shared state. For details, please refer to [4].
TABLE I: Sharing status of resources pipeline
Pipeline Hard resources Shared / Duplicated
IF
ITLB Duplicated
Branch prediction Either duplicated or shared
ID
TC
Shared
Microcode ROM
Instruction Scheduling
EXE Execution Units Shared
Execution Port
DTLB
MEM Cache Shared
Bus
Retire - Shared
B. SMT Transient Channel
The side-channel attack is a kind of physical attacks in
which an adversary tries to exploit physical information
leakages such as timing information, power consumption, or
electromagnetic radiation [5] to get some secret message from
victims.
The micro-architecture time side channel is a kind of side
channel. It uses the time-variant during program execution to
infer critical information. Notably, the time track is related
to micro-architecture state. Micro-architecture state includes
persistent state and transient state [21]. So channels includes
persistent state channel and transient state channel. Persistent
state can be maintained during context switching, and persis-
tent state channels exploit the limited storage space within the
targeted microarchitectural resources. Transient state cannot be
retained during the context switching. Transient-state channels,
in contrast, exploit the limited bandwidth of the targeted
element.
SMT channel is a subset of the microarchitectural time
side channels. Because of SMT technology, the attacker and
the victim share microarchitectural components in a physical
core. Attacker gets secret message through analysing the
state of shared micro-architecture components. As a kind of
microarchitectural time side channel, the SMT side channel is
also divided into persistent and transient channels. The state
SMT Transient State Channel
Fig. 1: The relationship between different side channels and
the scope we research.
of the microarchitecture utilized by the SMT transient state
channel cannot be maintained in context switching, and the
channel needs the support of Hyper-Threading Technology.
Figure 1 describes the relationship between different side
channels.
Typical SMT transient channels are PortsMash, Cachebleed,
MemJam and so on. PortsMash was proposed by Aldaya
et al in 2018 [6]. This side-channel attack exploits CPU
execution port contention. If two threads are using the same
port during execution, there will be CPU execution port con-
tention. Although Instruction scheduling ensures fairness by
alternating execution of instructions, resource contention leads
to time delays. By recording and analyzing the time delay,
attackers can infer key information indirectly. CacheBleed
was presented by Yarom et al recently. It is a new cache-
timing attack affecting some older processors featuring Hyper-
Threading such as Sandy Bridge. The authors exploit the fact
that cache banks can only serve one request at a time, thus
issuing several requests to the same cache bank, i.e. accessing
the same offset within a cache line, results in bank contention,
leading to timing variations and leaking information about low
address bits [9]. MemJam is a side-channel attack that exploits
false dependency of memory read-after-write and provides a
high-quality cache level timing channel.
C. Threat Model
Figure 1 shows that this scheme only considers the protec-
tion scheme for SMT transient channel, and we do not con-
sider other side-channel attacks, including cross-core attacks.
Shared resources related to SMT transient channel include
cache (L1 Cache, L2 Cache), BTB, execution port, function
unit, ALU. It contains all the shared resources associated with
SMT, not just one of them.
III. DEMAND-BASED DYNAMIC MITIGATION
To mitigate the SMT transient channel, we propose the
DDM mechanism. As shown in Figure 3, the entire mechanism
consists of two paths: demand path and defense path.
A. Demand path
The demand path writes the user’s requirements to the
logical core registers, including security and performance
demands. As shown in Figure 3, the start node of the demand
path is the input of the user’s demand, which goes through the
interface application and operating system successively, and fi-
nally writes the users demands into the maps in corresponding
logical cores. Here we describe the role and internal principles
of steps in the demand path in turn.
a) Start Node (User demands): Users’ demand is the
requirement for the execution environment of their process.
Here, we consider the users’ security demands and perfor-
mance demands. Security demands (SD): The security re-
quirements of users on the execution environment reflects
the importance of user information. The more important the
information contained in the user process, the more secure
the execution environment is required. Performance demand
(PD): Performance demand describes the upper limit of user
tolerance for processor performance losses. Specifically, it is
a limitation on the amount of performance loss that can be
caused by securing critical processes.
b) Second node (Interface Software): Interface software
is a tool, which provides an interface for users to write their
requirements into the computer system. Users run the interface
software and enter their security and performance demand as
prompted.
c) Third node (OS): After receiving the call of interface
software, the operating system calls the system function to
write/read the requirements of the users into/from the hardware
register of each logical core.
d) End node (MAPs): DDM establishes two maps inside
each logical core. The two maps are demand map and action
map respectively. As shown in Figure 2, demand map estab-
lishes a mapping relationship between users identity and their
requirements. After writing their own identity and demands
into maps, the system can query user requirements according
to the user ID. Action map establishes the mapping rela-
tionship between user requirements and defense measures.We
assign an Action ID(AD) to each defense. The system can
query the corresponding defense measures according to re-
quirements.
User  IDs Demands Actions
Demand Map
Action Map
Fig. 2: End node (MAPs)
B. Defense Path
The task of defense path is to make corresponding dynamic
defense measures according to user requirements. As shown
in Figure 3, the start node of the defense path is security
and performance maps in every logical core. The next step
is to control the operation of SMT button with the output
information of the space dynamization component and the
Scheduling
Module
Interface Software
Space Dynamization
Time Dynamization
SMT 
Button
User Demands
. . .
Logical core 0
Demand Map
Action Map
Logical core 0
Demand Map
Action Map
Logical core 0
Demand Map
Action Map
Defense Path
Demand Path
Input
Application software
OS
Cores
Demand Map
SD
01
. . .
PD
01
. . .
AD
01
. . .
Action Map
Process ID
XX
. . .
SD
01
. . .
PD
01
. . .
Fig. 3: Structure of DDM
time dynamization comp onent (both are sub-component of
Scheduling module). SMT button aims to defend the SMT
transient state channel by minimizing resource sharing among
logical cores in the same core through process scheduling. We
introduce the role and internal principle of each node in the
defense path in turn.
a) Start Node (MAPs): Read the content in maps to get
the user’s security and performance demands.
b) Second Node (Space Dynamization): Dynamic de-
fense space determines the scope of defensive actions based on
data in maps, such as whether to defend the entire computer
system or protect only a single logical core. Because SMT-
based side-channel attacks mostly occur between different log-
ical cores of the same physical core (we call them homologous
logical core (HLC)), processes running on the HLC are the
critical defense objects. The space dynamization component
needs to determine the HLC of the logical core on which the
critical program resides. The basic granularity of the defense
is the logical core, so we first need to bind the key processes
to a fixed logical core.
c) Third Node (Time Dynamization): The role of this
node is to determine the running time of defense measures.
To minimize the performance penalty of suspending execution
resource sharing, the processor needs to minimize the hang
time of the logical core as much as possible. The basic idea is
to implement defense during the execution of key processes.
The system reverts to its original state before and after critical
process execution. Time dynamization component tracks the
execution time of key processes.
d) Fourth Node (SMT Button): In order to minimize the
shared resources between threads (logical cores) of the same
physical core during critical process execution. SMT button
sets the logical core to HALT state temporarily.
Currently, most of the existing methods disable SMT via
BIOS setting. Some methods with the help of the operating
system to use the system command to turn off hyper-threading
of all physical cores. In order to reduce the performance loss,
this paper proposes a new method of turning off SMT, which
has two characteristics: first, it can selectively turn off the SMT
function of the specified physical core; second, we can restart
the thread before critical thread starting and after it finishing.
This new approach relies on the processor’s low-power
switching capabilities. There is an instruction in Intel’s instruc-
tion set called HLT. The instruction can stop instruction exe-
cution and places the processor in a HALT state. An enabled
interrupt, a debug exception or a signal will resume execution.
If an interrupt is used to resume execution after an HLT
instruction, the saved instruction pointer (CS:EIP) points to
the instruction following the HLT instruction[10]. Especially,
when an HLT instruction is executed on an Intel 64 or IA-32
processor supporting Intel Hyper-Threading Technology, only
the logical processor that executes the instruction is halted.
The other logical processors in the physical processor remain
active unless they are each individually halted by executing an
HLT instruction.
(a) Running with multi-threads
(b)dOnly thread1 runs normally. (c) Only thread2 runs normally.
Thread 1
state
Thread 2
state
Thread 1
state
Thread 2
state
Thread 2 occupies 
execution resources.
Fig. 4: On a processor with Hyper-Threading Technology,
resources are allocated to a single logical processor if the other
threads are in halt state. When all logical cores run at the same
time, resources are shared between all threads.
As shown in Figure 4(a), when multiple logical cores are
running simultaneously on a physical core, the unit that stores
Demand 
Path 
Begin
Bind critical processes 
to logical cores
 UserA: Processor 0
Set Security
/Performance  
Demand
UserA SD:=01
UserA PD:=01
UserA 
Running
UserB 
Requests
Processor 1  
Check The Requested Processor Cores
1) Find HLC
2) Is it within DDM's current defense range
UserB
Running
Reject 
UserB    
User C 
Requests
Processor 2  
User C  
Running  
UserA 
End
Demand Path 
End 
Defense Path 
Begin
Defense 
Path End
TimeLine
T5
T3
T4
T6
T7
T8
T9
T11
T12
T13
T14
T15
T1
Executing on the demand path (from T1 to T5)
Executing on the defense path (from T5 to T14)
T10    
Set
Action
Map 
T2
Fig. 5: Application of DDM in specific scenarios
processor state (mostly registers) is unique to each logical
core, and the execution resources are shared. As shown in
Figure 4(b) and 4(c), When only one thread (one logical
processor) is active, all execution resources are re-combined
to give the single active thread (logical processor). HLT stops
the execution of the instruction but does not change the state
of the register. Therefore, when the logic core is stopped to
a low-power state, it does not affect the execution of other
logic cores or interferes with the execution state of its own
thread, and it also eliminates the side-channel attack caused
by execution resource sharing.
In a real scenario, when a critical thread needs to be isolated,
the system will suspend the other logical cores in some
physical into a low-power state. When the critical program
finished, the recovery signal is sent, and the rest instructions
continue to execute. In essence, this new approach does not
really disable SMT but rather suspends the logical core or
thread execution dynamically. However, it achieves the same
result as shutting down SMT directly, avoiding contention for
execution resources.
e) End Node (Logical Cores): The logical core is sched-
uled by SMT button. If there are two logical cores in a physical
core, one of which executes the key program and applies
for protection, then the other logical core will automatically
switch to HALT state once receiving the scheduling signal of
SMT button. Then the resource shared between threads will
be distributed to only a logical core, so that SMT transient
state channel will be avoided.
C. Illustrative Example
The example in Figure 5 demonstrates a usage scenario on
a processor with DDM. The DDM execution timeline has two
phases: Executing on the demand path (from T1 to T5) and
Executing on the defense path (from T5 to T14).
• At T2, the processor administrator completes the setting
of the processor action map and determines the relation-
ship between user demands and security measures.
• At T3, DDM binds the user process to the specified
processor logic core. At T4, users write their security and
performance requirements to the processor. Take user A
as an example, assuming that user A is a protected critical
process. User A is scheduled to execute on processor 0,
his security requirement id is 01, and his performance
requirement id is 01, both of which are written to the reg-
ister of processor 0. According to the Action map written
in advance, the security and performance requirements of
user A jointly determine that DDM will take the defensive
measures coded as 01 to protect user A.
• At T6, user A starts running on the DDM-protected
processor.
• At T7, user B requests to run, and then at T8, DDM
checks it. The results show that user B’s operation may
threaten the security of user A’s process. Because user B
will be running on processor 1, which belongs to the same
physical core as processor 0, there will be some sharing
of storage and execution resources. So at T9, processor
1 blocks user B from running until user A finishes.
• Unlike user B, user C passed the security check. Because
HLC of processor 2 did not execute the critical task.
Therefore the execution of user C does not threaten the
information security of critical programs, and user C is
up and running at T12.
• At T13, user A task finishes and DDM turns off the
defense switch. The computer system revert to the raw
operating state.
• After the DDM is turned off, user B executes normally
on processor 1 on T15.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
Table II summarizes the experimental environment for our
experiment and evaluation. We use the Intel (R) Core(TM)
i7-6700 processor from the Skylake architecture family with
a 3.4GHZ main frequency. The CPU supports SMT and has
four physical cores. Each physical core is divided into two
logical cores and supports the execution of two threads at
the same time. The operating system used in the experiment
was Ubuntu 16.04. Similar to the vast majority of processors
supporting hyper-threading, most resources in Skylake archi-
tecture processor are fully shared between threads to improve
the dynamic utilization of the resources, including L2 and
LLC caches and all the execution units[10]. The experimental
results are representative.
TABLE II: Experimental environment
Processor model Intel (R) Core(TM) i7-6700
Microarchitecture Skylake
Clock frequency 3.4GHZ
Physical cores 4
Logical cores 8
Kernel version Kernel-4.17.4 (Ubuntu16.04)
SMT support support
A. Implementation of Demand path
a) Core Level: DDM writes the demand map and action
map to register groups. In the implementation of the scheme,
we use the MSR register group of Intel CAT. MSR (Model
Specific Register) is a concept in x86 architecture. It refers
to a series of registers used in x86 architecture processors to
control CPU operation, function switch, debugging, trace pro-
gram execution, monitor CPU performance and other aspects.
When it came to the Intel Pentium processor, Intel officially
introduced RDMSR and WRMSR, two instructions for reading
and writing MSR register. Figure 6 shows the implementation
details of the two maps in the MSR registers.
63 36 35 34 33 32 31 0
Demand Map
( IA32 PO  ASS MSR )

Security
Demands
Performance
Demands
 Process ID
2 bs 2 s User IDs
Action Map
( A Bl	
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User A Demand Action 00
User B Demand Action 01
 
User n Demand Action n
Fig. 6: Implementation of MAPs
We quantified the security demands (SD) of users and used
2 bits to describe the SD of users. The larger the number,
the higher the security requirement. Two bits are also used to
quantify the user’s performance demands (PD). The larger the
code, the greater the performance loss. As shown in Figure 6,
the security demands correspond to the 34 to 35 bit of the MSR
register. The performance demands correspond to the 32 to 33
bit of the MSR register. The lower bits of the register store
the user process ID. The action map is established by a block
of MSRs (the number of MSRs is security and performance
demands combinations).
b) Application Software level: To read and write regis-
ters, we made a tool called DDMtool to finish the task of
interface software. Users can use it to read and write MSR
register sets directly.
B. Implementation of Defense path
Most implementations of the defense path are in the oper-
ating system.
a) Space Dynamization: We determine the space of de-
fenses based on the user’s security and performance demands.
Different requirements correspond to different defense inten-
sity, and different defense intensity corresponds to different
defense space. The weakest way coded Action 00 is to do
nothing to protect the processor. The second coded Action 01
is to protect only a single physical core. The logical cores
suspended by SMT buttons belong to only one physical core.
The strongest coded Action 10 is to protect all processor cores.
In other words, suspend all logical cores except the one used
by the user who needs protecting. We define a variable CD
whose value is equal to the geometric average of SD and PD:
CD =
√
SD2 + PD2
When CD satisfies CD <
√
2,we take action00. When CD
satisfies
√
2 ≤ CD ≥ 2√2, we take action01. The same way,
if CD satisfies CD > 2
√
2, we take action10.
b) Time Dynamization: The processor monitors the op-
eration of the key process and its logical core. When the key
process runs, the SMT button opens; when the key process
finishes, the SMT button closes.
c) SMT Button: We utilize HLT instruction to added
a system call function called sys hlt( ) with system call
number 548. The logical core that calls this system call will
halt,avoiding contention between logical cores for execution
resources.
V. EVALUATION
A. Security Evaluation
To evaluate the security, We tested to see if DDM can
defend CPU against PortsMash attacks.We targeted a tunnel
TLS server authenticating with a P-384 certificate, the Spy
measuring port contention in parallel as the server produces
ECDSA signatures. Due to the application of hyper-threading
technology, there is contention for execution ports. PortsMash
captures the port contention delay during double and add
operations, resulting in an accurate raw signal trace containing
the sequence of operations during scalar multiplication, and
leaking enough information of secret nonce k to later succeed
in the key recovery phase.
Figure 8 shows the time delay tracks observed by spies in
different situations. Figure 8(a) is no protection for ECDHE
and ECDSA, and an attacker can easily detect the regular delay
trajectory caused by the execution port contention. Then the
mathematical operations related to the key are deduced from
the time delay trajectory. However, when using the DDM
defense measures shown in Figure 8(c), it is difficult for
an attacker to detect the delay changes caused by resource
contention. As Figure 8(b) shows, we know that turning off
SMT in BIOS can successfully protect against PortsMash, then
the time delay trace is smooth. When the system is under
DDM protection, the program execution time delay trace is
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Fig. 7: The average slowdown of each of SPEC2000 benchmarks with two different mitigation.
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(c) Running with DDM 
Fig. 8: The time delay tracks observed by spies in different
situations. (a) is a normal attack time delay diagram without
adding any defensive measures. (b) is the time delay trace
detected by spy after SMT is turned off in BIOS Settings. (c)
is the time delay track obtained by the key correlation program
running under the protection of DDM.
also smooth. Both time traces in figure 8(b) and figure 8(c)
are independent of keys. Therefore, we think that DDM can
effectively protect against PortsMash and it is impossible to
recover private key by spying ports contention.
B. Performance Evaluation
We measure the impact on legacy applications using
SPEC2000. We run each benchmark three times to completion
using the reference (for SPEC2000) input sets and compare
the results against the baseline cases without the DDM and
without hyper-threading. Because the DDM takes up CPU
running time, we expect some performance degradation. We
choose SPEC rate metrics to measure the throughput or rate
of CPU carrying out a number of tasks[18]. The experimental
processor has 8 logical cores, so we set 8 copies of the bench-
marks that are running simultaneously during the experiment.
Figure 7 shows that the performance of the DDM slowdown is
less than the closed hyper-threading directly. Evaluation results
showed that the performance loss caused by DDM was less
than 8% in both int and fp tests. It is worth noting that some
values in the test were negative numbers when hyperthreading
was turned off, indicating improved performance. DDM does
not cause performance loss in these benchmarks but brings
performance gain to the processor. Our explanation for this ex-
perimental phenomenon is that DDM dynamically shuts down
hyperthreading, reducing the congestion caused by resource
competition and shortening the running time of benchmarks
such as 179.art and 300.twolf. To sum up, we conclude that
DDM incurs a small performance degradation.
VI. DISCUSSION
This study shows that DDM is a practical, simple and
low performance loss method to mitigate SMT-based side
channels. It has been demonstrated in two ways. First, in
our security assessment, we have demonstrated that DDM
effectively protects against PortsMash vulnerabilities caused
by execution port contention. In addition, because DDM
can turn off execution resource sharing dynamically between
logical cores during the execution of a process, it theoretically
protects the processor from most side-channels that rely on
hyper-threading execution resource sharing. Second, in the per-
formance evaluation, experimental results show that DDM has
a small performance loss. Especially measuring and comparing
compute-intensive integer(CINT) performance, the throughput
or rate of a processor with DDM has a big advantage over
processor which is disabled SMT statically in bios.
We have attempted to extend two aspects of previous work
on contralateral channel defense. The first is to expand the
scope of defense against side-channel attacks, rather than
limiting them to cache side channels. The second is to propose
a dynamic low-performance loss strategy, which is different
from the previous high-performance loss defense schemes such
as constant time[13, 14, 15, 19, 20], disable SMT[11] and
inject noise[16].
VII. CONCLUSION
We propose DDM, a lightweight system security mechanism
for the cloud provider and cloud customers to protect security-
sensitive code and data against execution resources shared
side channels, by tuning the hyper-threading of the processor
dynamically. DDM builds on existing commodity hardware
and can be easily deployed. It bridges the gap between
protecting security applications and the existing performance-
oriented hyper-threading technology.
The DDM uses the MSR register set to establish two
mappings within the processor, which are security demands
and security actions. Users can write security requirements for
code and data into the map. Information written to registers
is managed and invoked by the operating system. According
to the safety requirements of users, we suspend logic cores
dynamically to achieve the purpose of temporarily shutting
down hyper-threading technology dynamically. Restore the
normal function of the processor immediately after the critical
program execution. Our evaluation shows that DDM not only
effectively mitigates the SMT-based side channels but also
introduces very small performance degradation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported by the Institute of Information
Engineering (IIE), Chinese Academy of Sciences. Thanks to
my family and friends for their support and understanding.
REFERENCES
[1] Gras B, Razavi K, Bos H, et al. Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating
Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB Attacks[C]//27th USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18). 2018: 955-972.
[2] Tullsen D M, Eggers S J, Levy H M. Simultaneous multithreading:
Maximizing on-chip parallelism[C]//ACM SIGARCH Computer Archi-
tecture News. ACM, 1995, 23(2): 392-403.M. King and B. Zhu, Gaming
strategies, in Path Planning to the West, vol. II, S. Tang and M. King,
Eds. Xian: Jiaoda Press, 1998, pp. 158-176.
[3] Eggers S J, Emer J S, Levy H M, et al. Simultaneous multithreading: A
platform for next-generation processors[J]. IEEE micro, 1997 (5): 12-
19.J.-G. Lu, Title of paper with only the first word capitalized, J. Name
Stand. Abbrev., in press.
[4] Marr D T, Binns F, Hill D L, et al. Hyper-Threading Technology
Architecture and Microarchitecture[J]. Intel Technology Journal, 2002,
6(1).
[5] Standaert F X. Introduction to side-channel attacks[M]//Secure Inte-
grated Circuits and Systems. Springer, Boston, MA, 2010: 27-42.
[6] Aldaya A C, Brumley B B, ul Hassan S, et al. Port contention for fun
and profit[C]//Port Contention for Fun and Profit. IEEE, 0.
[7] Gras B, Razavi K, Bos H, et al. Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating
Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB Attacks[C]//27th USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18). 2018: 955-972.
[8] Ge Q, Yarom Y, Cock D, et al. A survey of microarchitectural timing
attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware[J]. Journal of
Cryptographic Engineering, 2018, 8(1): 1-27.
[9] Yarom Y, Genkin D, Heninger N. CacheBleed: a timing attack on
OpenSSL constant-time RSA[J]. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering,
2017, 7(2): 99-112.
[10] Guide P. Intel 64 and ia-32 architectures software developers manual[J].
Volume 3B: System programming Guide, Part, 2011, 2.
[11] Marshall A, Howard M, Bugher G, et al. Security best practices for
developing windows azure applications[J]. Microsoft Corp, 2010: 42.
[12] Steven G, Christianson B, Collins R, et al. A superscalar architecture to
exploit instruction level parallelism[J]. Microprocessors and Microsys-
tems, 1997, 20(7): 391-400.
[13] Rane A, Lin C, Tiwari M. Secure, precise, and fast floating-point
operations on x86 processors[C]//25th USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 16). 2016: 71-86.
[14] Gueron S. Intels new AES instructions for enhanced performance
and security[C]//International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption.
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009: 51-66.
[15] Gueron S, Kounavis M E. Intel carry-less multiplication instruction and
its usage for computing the GCM mode[J]. White Paper, 2010.
[16] Hu W M. Reducing timing channels with fuzzy time[J]. Journal of
computer security, 1992, 1(3-4): 233-254.
[17] Liu F, Ge Q, Yarom Y, et al. Catalyst: Defeating last-level cache
side channel attacks in cloud computing[C]//2016 IEEE international
symposium on high performance computer architecture (HPCA). IEEE,
2016: 406-418.
[18] Henning J L. SPEC CPU2000: Measuring CPU performance in the new
millennium[J]. Computer, 2000, 33(7): 28-35.
[19] Coppens B, Verbauwhede I, De Bosschere K, et al. Practical miti-
gations for timing-based side-channel attacks on modern x86 proces-
sors[C]//2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE,
2009: 45-60.
[20] Bernstein D J, Lange T, Schwabe P. The security impact of a new
cryptographic library[C]//International Conference on Cryptology and
Information Security in Latin America. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
2012: 159-176.
[21] Aciicmez O, Seifert J P. Cheap hardware parallelism implies cheap se-
curity[C]//Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
(FDTC 2007). IEEE, 2007: 80-91.
[22] Moghimi A, Wichelmann J, Eisenbarth T, et al. Memjam: A false
dependency attack against constant-time crypto implementations[J]. In-
ternational Journal of Parallel Programming, 2019, 47(4): 538-570.
[23] Percival C. Cache missing for fun and profit[J]. 2005.
[24] Kim T, Peinado M, Mainar-Ruiz G. STEALTHMEM: System-
Level Protection Against Cache-Based Side Channel Attacks in the
Cloud[C]//Presented as part of the 21st USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 12). 2012: 189-204.
[25] Wang Z, Lee R B. Covert and side channels due to processor architec-
ture[C]//2006 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
(ACSAC’06). IEEE, 2006: 473-482.
[26] Grunwald D, Ghiasi S. Microarchitectural denial of service: Insuring mi-
croarchitectural fairness[C]//35th Annual IEEE/ACM International Sym-
posium on Microarchitecture, 2002.(MICRO-35). Proceedings. IEEE,
2002: 409-418.Gras B, Razavi K, Bos H, et al. Translation Leak-
aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB
Attacks[C]//27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18).
2018: 955-972.
